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Mr. President, Members of the Faculty, Ladies and 
Gentlemen: 
My presence in Williamsburg today is in obedience 
to a command from the President and Faculty of this 
venerable and venerated Institution to assemble with 
them to receive a high honor. And since I can find 
no words with which to adequately express to them my 
gratitude for the distinction conferred on me this 
morning, I can only utter, in my solemn pride, a heart-
felt "thank you,"-a thanks which I beg you to be-
lieve is "deeper than the lip." 
In asking me to address you this evening the 
President and Faculty do me further honor, if at the 
same time they lay upon me a heavy burden. For 
in no place which I have ever known are the atmosphere 
and surroundings heavier with the memory,-the 
presence, I should say,-of great ones who have gone 
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before, than here. Who those great ones are, what 
names they bore, I have no need to remind you. 
Therefore, in grasping this second proffered honor, I 
do so, like the poet's schoolboy, with a "fearful joy," 
yet in the soothing consciousness that where true learn-
ing prevails, indulgence and charity are her hand-
maidens. 
Rudyard Kipling reminds us somewhere that "the 
sole revenge that maturity can take upon youth for 
the sin of being young, is to preach at it." I hasten, 
therefore, to assure my young friends here this evening 
that I shall have nothing didactic or comminatory to 
address to them. 
I hesitated a long time in selecting a topic for 
this talk. As I drew nearer to the homeland, with 
each revolution of the screw of my steamer the name 
"Virginia! Virginia!" sounded like a drum tap in heart 
and brain, provoking memories subconscious and an-
cestral; and I planned an address in which the dear 
syllables would be repeated with a happy iteration; 
"Virginia,"-with no pedantic or geographical implica-
tions, but as a word symbolizing an attitude toward 
life,-an attempt to see life clearly and see it whole. 
But much in my mind also was the great nation to 
the south of us in which during the past four years I 
have labored as the diplomatic representative of our 
government. And so, in the weeks of travel preceding 
my landing, realizing that vital constitutional ques-
tions are now to the fore in our country, I nursed the 
idea that a comparison of the Constitution of the 
Argentine nation with that of the United States, on 
which the former is based, might not be without in-
terest to you. 
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And just here, in support of my assertion that 
Argentine statesmen in drafting their Constitution 
chose that of the United States as a model, I quote 
the following declaration of the Chairman of the Com-
mittee on Constitutional Amendments to the Buenos 
Aires Convention of 1860; he said: 
liThe committee has been guided in 
its recommendations by the provisions 
of a similar constitution, recognized as 
the most perfect, viz., that of the United 
States. 
"The provisions of this Consti tu tion 
are most readily applicable to Argentine 
conditions, having served as the basis for 
the formation of the Argentine Con-
federation . . . The democratic gov-
ernment of the United States represents 
the last word of human logic, for the 
Constitution of the United States is the 
only one that has been made for and by 
the people " 
Thirty-four years later we find the Argentine 
Supreme Court declaring that: 
liThe system of government under 
which we are living was not of our 
creation. We found it in operation, 
tested by the experience of many years, 
and adopted it for our system." 
However, such a discussion as the one I had 
meditated to be adequate should be at least an attempt 
to show in what ways, with the passage of the years, 
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the Argentine nation has worked out the problem of 
the relation between constitutional form and con-
stitutional practice,-in a word, the operation of 
constitutional provisions almost identical in form with 
our own under very different conditions. 
And in this undertaking it would be also neces-
sary to show that leaving aside the physical environ-
ment and economic conditions of the Argentine and 
the United States, which present certain points of 
similarity, the political antecedents and traditions of 
the two countries are fundamentally different. 
But no one better than yourselves can appreciate 
why I shrank before the magnitude of such a task. 
There came to mind Taine's remark about the critic 
and Shakespeare. The critic, you will remember, he 
tells us, is lost in Shakespeare as a traveler in the 
streets of a great city; he is shown a few buildings and 
told to imagine the rest! 
Therefore, before this mental impasse,-this gulf 
separating inclination from capacity,-I decided I 
might best fulfill the flattering mandate of President 
Bryan and the Faculty if I limited my remarks to 
suggesting certain analogies and differences between 
those clauses of the respective constitutions which re-
late to the powers of the executive and the powers 
of the judiciary, in the hope that my words might 
stimulate some of you to independent study of the 
whole field. Such a study is well worth your while, 
for, apart from its intrinsic value as an outstanding 
work of legislation, the Argentine Constitution pro-
vides the best example to be found of the application 
of English law under Hispanic administration, of the 
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grafting of a shoot from Anglo-Saxon genius on a stock 
whose roots grew in Latin soil. 
By way of baldest background, I would recall to 
you the Declaration of Independence given to the 
world by the United Provinces of La Plata on July 9, 
1816. But these United Provinces, despite their name, 
were sadly torn asunder for many years. Various 
governing juntas gave way under stress of circum-
stances to a triumvirate, to be displaced by a supreme 
director. 
Finally, in 1829, there appears on the stage of 
Argentine history a sanguinary figure,-J uan Manuel 
Rosas. Becoming Governor of Buenos Aires, he in-
augurated a period of personal rule known in Argentine 
history as "The Tyranny," which lasted until 1852, 
when, following the defeat of his army, he fled the 
country, never to return. 
In 1853, the year succeeding the flight of Rosas, 
there met in the city of Santa Fe a group of outstand-
ing men charged with the duty of drafting a con-
stitution for the Argentine nation. The result of 
their labors, based on our great charter, remains today, 
with amendments made in 1860, 1866, and 1898, the 
palladium of the people's rights. 
These delegates were not representatives of united 
states or provinces, but of the Argentine nation.-"We, 
the representatives of the people of the Argentine 
nation," reads the preamble. 
Let us now consider the clauses of the Argentine 
Constitution referring to the executive and judicial 
power-to which I have alluded as being the subject 
of my remarks. 
In any consideration of the position of the ex-
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ecutive under the Argentine Constitution as compared 
with our own, it should be borne in mind that, as a 
political philosopher once observed, the Anglo-Saxon 
ind is essentially" legislative, and the Latin min 
e~!ially executive. Argentina inherited from Spain 
traditions of a vigorous executive, accustomed to act 
without consulting any other authority, and dominat-
ing the legislative authority whenever brought into 
conflict therewith. The idea of an executive subordi-
nated to the legislature was completely foreign to 
Spanish ideas of the eighteenth century, and through 
the past hundred years in Argentine history the 
supremacy of the executive over the legislative au-
thority has been characteristic of the political develop-
ment of the country, both in provincial and federal 
governments. 
The Argentine Constitution declares that "the 
executive power of the nation shall be exercised by a 
citizen with the title of 'President of the Argentine 
Nation.''' The remaining clauses under this head in 
general follow those of the United States, but go be-
yond them, for it was the desire and the intent of the 
framers of the Argentine Constitution to grant far 
greater power to the executive than is granted under 
our own, to the end that he should be able to maintain 
national unity. On the other hand, at the time of the 
adoption of the Argentine Constitution the country 
was still staggering under the shock of the Rosas 
dictatorship; and since this could not be quite for-
gotten, the result was a grant of great power, coupled 
with numerous provisions intended to prevent its 
abuse. 
Some of the clauses which depart from the Ameri-
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can model may be appositely cited: The President 
may not leave the country, or even the capital, with-
out the consent of Congress; should he do so, the Vice-
President becomes President pro-tempore. Again, an 
Argentine President must be a member of the Roman 
Catholic Church, with all the conservative implica-
tions of such allegiance. He must have an income of 
approximately two thousand dollars. He must be a 
native citizen, or, if born abroad, the son of a native 
citizen. (The inclusion of sons of native Argentinians 
born in foreign lands as presidentially eligible was 
deemed advisable primarily because of the great num-
ber of patriots who had been driven from the country 
under "The Tyranny," and whose sons, in conse-
quence, had been born abroad.) The moderate in-
come requirement inserted in this article serves to 
illustrate the conservatism of the men of 1853 who 
dominated the Santa Fe convention. 
A fierce parliamentary debate was waged over 
the provision that the President and Vice-President be 
members of the Roman Catholic communion. Some 
pointed out that it was contrary to the liberal spirit 
of the day; others maintained that the proviso was 
unnecessary, since the overwhelming majority of the 
inhabitants of the nation were, as they are today, 
Roman Catholics, and would naturally elect a member 
of their own faith to the highest office of the nation. 
Still others argued vehemently that the very fact of 
Roman Catholic numerical superiority in Argentina 
made it necessary for the welfare of the country to 
guard against the possibility of any but a Roman 
Catholic becoming President; and, as is seen, this 
latter view ultimately prevailed. 
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The period of office of the President and Vice-
President of Argentina is six years, and they can not 
be re-elected without the interval of one term. In 
this provision we again see uneasiness over the possi-
bility of a dictatorship. (And just here I may men-
tion that in Argentine legal and journalistic circles the 
proposition recently advanced looking to extending 
the term of the President of the United States to six 
years, without the right of immediate re-election, is 
being followed with great interest; there seems to be 
a consensus of opinion in Argentina that the six-year 
term presents many advantages over quadrennial 
periods). 
As in our country, the President and Vice-Presi-
dent are elected by presidential electors from each 
province chosen by direct votes of the people. 
A noteworthy deviation of the Argentine Constitu-
tion from its American model is in the provision that 
the President shall take part in the framing of laws, in 
addition to approving and promulgating them. Hence 
the President, who is, or should be, in a better position 
than anyone else to know the needs of the country, is 
permitted to frame and to introduce into Congress 
such measures as he may deem advisable, instead of 
making mere suggestions and recommendations, leav-
ing it to friendly Congressmen to prepare measures 
which may only in part meet his wishes. Since the 
Argentine viewpoint is a flat recognition that good 
government implies sympathy and good-will between 
the executive and the legislature, it is unreasonable 
from this viewpoint to expect adequate enforcement 
of laws by a branch of the government which had no 
hand in their making and which may be out of sym-
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pathy with-them. The authority thus conferred on 
the President to initiate legislation would seem to 
possess certain obvious advantages over our limitation 
of his powers to making and sending messages on the 
state of the Union! 
You will recall that the President of the United 
States, with the consent of the Senate, names all 
officers whose appointment is not otherwise provided 
for by the Constitution. No such limitation exists in 
the case -of the President of Argentina. He can thus 
exercise a tremendous power, and is enabled to resist 
attempts of the legislative authority to encroach upon 
executive prerogative. And if critics have pointed out 
that from time to time there has been abuse of this 
exclusive appointing power, the question arises whether 
the requirement of senatorial approval would mean 
much more than that a greater number of politicians 
would share in the distribution of offices among 
faithful henchmen. 
Again, the Argentine President has power by 
himself alone to appoint as well as to remove the mem-
bers of his cabinet. This seems an entirely reasonable 
and logical provision, when the intimate nature of their. 
official relationship to the executive is considered. 
(This power of removal of members of the cabinet 
was also granted to the President under the Constitu-
tion of the Confederate States.) 
An essential point in the Argentine Constitution 
of 1853 is found in provisions requiring that all Acts 
and Orders of the President be countersigned by a 
member of his cabinet. This reflects an uneasiness 
on the part of Argentine political leaders, to be re-
marked from the earliest period, lest the executive 
11 
escape a measure of responsibility unless responsible 
ministers joined in his acts. Here we see an extraneous 
inflow, for a similar safeguard appears in the French 
Constitution of 1791. 
It is thus to be remarked that under the Argentine 
political system cabinet ministers occupy a distinct 
constitutional position, whereas, as is well known, our 
Constitution is silent on this point. It would seem 
from this constitutional provision relating to Ar-
gentine ministers of State,-that each "is responsible 
for the acts which he authorizes,"-that some attempt 
would have been made to bring them under the con-
trol of the congress, in order that responsibility might 
be fixed. However, Article Sixty-three of the Ar-
gentine Constitution, which authorizes each house to 
require the presence of the ministers of the executive 
power to receive from them "explanations and in-
formation which may be deemed necessary," can hardly 
be said to achieve this purpose, since on at least one 
important occasion the minister in question refused 
to be interpellated, and contented himself with a 
declaration of his policy! Yet this provision of the 
Constitution does give the President the opportunity 
to have present in the sessions of the Congress a mem-
ber of the cabinet ready at any time to set forth his 
position. In practice, therefore, a bill initiated by 
the executive power need not be left to the hostility 
or indifference of the Congress, but may be defended 
on the floor of either house by a member of the cabinet. 
Just here you will recall the provision in the Con-
stitution of the Confederate States authorizing Con-
gress by specific law to grant "To the principal officer 
in each of the executive departments a seat upon the 
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floor of either, with the privilege of discussing any 
measures appertaining to his department." 
From what has been said it is evident that the 
Argentine constitutional system is essentially presi-
dential, and this is a completely logical flowering of 
national political genius, since the political ideas of 
the Argentine people, inherited from Spain, led them 
instinctively to support the executive as against the 
legislative authority. And it is to the executive that 
the people have always looked for great reforms. 
This is well illustrated by the action of President 
Roque Saenz Pena, who brought about the enactment 
of a new election law making voting obligatory and 
providing for the secrecy of the ballot. The result of 
this law was to bring into Congress new and inde-
pendent forces which have shown their influence, and 
which have marked a new epoch in the political de-
velopment of the Republic. 
The Argentine people have never been afraid of 
conferring great powers on their chief executives; at 
the same time they have endeavored, as suggested, to 
provide safeguards against an excessive and arbitrary 
use of the powers thus granted. Political leaders and 
others in the United States would seem to have had a 
somewhat contrary view. And in this connection it 
seems apposite to quote from two great political 
philosophers concerning the position of the President 
of the United States. 
Woodrow Wilson, a number of years before be-
coming President, wrote: 
"The President is at liberty, both 
in law and conscience, to be as big a man 
as he can. His capacity will set the 
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limit; and if the Congress be overborne 
by him it will be no fault of the makers 
of the Constitution,-it will be from no 
lack of constitutional powers on its part, 
but only because the President has the 
nation behind him, and the Congress has 
not. He has no means of compelling 
Congress except through public opinion." 
J ames Bryce, discussing the power of the ex-
ecutive, in his great work says: 
"It used to be thought that heredi-
tary monarchs were strong because they 
reigned by a right of their own, not de-
rived from the people. A President is 
strong for the exactly opposite reason, 
because his rights come straight from 
the people. We shall have frequent 
occasion to observe that nowhere is the 
rule of public opinion so complete as in 
America, or so direct; that is to say, so 
independent of the ordinary machinery 
of government. Now the President is 
deemed to represent the people no less 
than do the members of the legislature. 
Public opinion governs by and through 
him no less than them, and makes him 
powerful even against a popularly elected 
Congress. " 
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Bryce continues: 
"Although few Presidents have shown 
any disposition to strain their authority, 
it has often been the fashion in America 
to be jealous of the President's action, 
and to warn citizens against what is 
called 'the one man power.' General 
Ulysses S. Grant was hardly the man to 
make himself a tyrant, yet the hostility 
to a third term of office which moved 
many people who had not been alienated 
by the faults of his ~dministration, 
rested not merely on reverence for the 
example set by Washington, but also on 
the fear that a President repeatedly 
chosen would become dangerous to re-
publican institutions. This particular 
alarm seems to a European groundless. 
I do not deny that a really great man 
might exert ampler authority from the 
presidential chair than most of its bc-
cupants have done " 
Concluding, this great authority says: 
"But it is hard to imagirie a Presi-
dent overthrowing the existing Con-
stitution. He has no standing army, 
and he cannot create one. Congress can 
checkmate him by stopping supplies. 
There is no aristocracy to rally round 
him. Every State furnishes an inde-
pendent centre of resistance. If he were 
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to attempt a coup d'etat it could only be 
by appealing to the people against Con-
gress, and Congress could hardly, con-
sidering that it is re-elected every two 
years, attempt to oppose the people. 
One must suppose a condition bordering 
on civil war, and the President putting 
the resources of the executive at the 
service of one of the intending bel-
ligerents, already strong and organized, 
in order to conceive a case in which he 
will be formidable to freedom." 
Let us turn now to those clauses of the Argentine 
and United States Constitutions which refer to the 
judiciary: 
With those of our own Constitution you are 
familiar in their general lines, while recent discussions 
of this subject in the press and elsewhere should have 
added to,--or clouded,-your knowledge of it. 
The organization, jurisdiction, and powers of the 
federal judiciary of Argentina follow closely those out~ 
lined in the Constitution of the United States. Article 
ninety-four of the Argentine Constitution is similar 
to Section 1, Article 3, of our Constitution. It pro-
vides that 
"The judicial power of the nation 
shall be vested in a supreme court of 
justice and in such other inferior courts 
as Congress may establish in the national 
territory. " 
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As was intimated in our examination of the 
executive authority,-that in earlier days the legis-
lative power was largely subservient to it,-so, in con-
sidering the Argentine judicial system it must equally 
be borne in mind that neither in the historical back-
ground of Spanish tradition nor in the early political 
development of the country is there evidence of the 
existence of an independent judicial authority suf-
ficiently strong to assert itself as against the ex-
ecutive. In fact, as has been indicated by an out-
standing modern scholar, Dr. L. S. Rowe, to whom I 
am greatly indebted, the history of Spain during the 
eighteenth century both at home and in the colonies 
is a record of the complete subordination of the 
judiciary to executive control. It flows from this. 
that the problem confronting the people of Argentina 
was totally different from that with which the people 
of the United States had to deal. The United States 
inherited a system in which the foundations for the 
development of an independent judiciary had been 
already laid. In Argentina, on the contrary, there 
was a long struggle between the executive and the 
judiciary, resulting in the ultimate freeing of the 
latter from a subservient position and the attainment 
of its present high independent character. 
Examining now the Argentine Supreme Court, it 
may be pointed out that the number of justices is 
five. Retirement is voluntary. Any time between 
the ages of fifty-five to sixty-nine the justices may re-
tire, provided they have completed thirty years in the 
federal service. (By this is meant any position in the 
civil service of the federal government; it would not 
include service in the Argentine Congress, army, or 
17 
navy-l On reaching seventy a justice may retire, 
provided he has served ten years in federal service. 
On retirement a justice receives a pension equivalent 
to that of his former salary. J.ustices hold office dur-
ing good behavior but may be removed therefrom 
under conditions precisely the same as those affecting 
'justices of the United States Supreme Court. While 
the Argentine Constitution of 1853 provided for nine 
justices, the present court, whose creation dates from 
1863, is composed of five justices whose number has 
'never been changed. The present Chief Justice is 
aged fifty-six; the aggregate age of the five justices 
is two hundred and ninety-seven years: an average 
of just over fifty-nine years. 
The court chooses its own Chief Justices, and 
possesses the powers equivalent to those of the United 
States Supreme Court with regard to passing upon 
the constitutionality of any federal, provincial, or 
'municipal law. No decision of the Argentine Supreme 
Court in this respect has ever been disputed. The 
court may on occasion declare a portion of a law un-
constitutional, whereupon the executive may submit 
'to Congress for enactment that portion which received 
the tacit approval of the Supreme Court. 
The various influences at work in the attempt to 
erect a free government upon the ruins of an absolutism, 
which so long crushed the people of Spain and her sub-
jects abroad, is plainly evident in the Argentine legal 
fabric. Furthermore, let us keep in mind that in 
countries accepting the Roman law the executive 
branch of government was the dominating element, 
while under the common law it was the legislative 
power. In other words, administrative control in 
18 
general characterized Roman law nations, while legis-
lative control has characterized those having the com-
mon law. Centralizatio~ is therefore natural in Ar-
gentina, and its initial problem now, as formerly, is 
to democratize a government with centralized ten-
dencies; in other words, to develop democracy from 
the top down, or the reverse of the process in the 
United States and England. And if one may dare to 
prophesy with regard to this great country, it would 
be that in Argentina, where there is familiarity with 
French political history and experience there will be 
evolved with the passage of the years, in orderly steps, 
a government of the French type,-a centralized 
democracy. And here, merely as illustrative of the 
influence of the Roman or French judicial concepts 
on Argentine law, it may be pointed out that under 
Clause 102 provision is made whereby the Congress 
may designate where offenders against the law may 
be tried for offences committed beyond the boundaries 
of the nation. Ordinarily, however, the trial of a 
criminal case is held in the province in which the act 
is alleged to have been committed. 
The matter of procedure under Argentine law has 
been a frequent topic in my conversations with Ar-
gentine lawyers and jurists. These seem to be of one 
mind in considering that Argentina is still struggling 
under the burden of an unwieldy system, inherited 
from Spain, and that reform is necessary. Both in 
the federal and provincial courts procedure is ex-
ceedingly cumbersome compared with either American 
or European countries, and the courts are behind in 
their docket. One cause of this doubtless arises from 
the fact that there is practically no oral procedure; 
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everything must be reduced to writing, including the 
testimony of witnesses. 
But when the high character and capacity of the 
judges of the Argentine Supreme Court and of the 
Buenos Aires bar is borne in mind, it can not but be 
anticipated that essential reforms will come with the 
passage of time. 
In closing these unpretentious observations of a 
layman, there comes to mind a remark of an English 
statesman to the effect that public speeches have their 
use-or justification--"if they lead men to dwell on 
thoughts of service to their country and of help to one 
another." I confess that the motive inspiring my 
words today is the desire to provoke in your minds a 
"high curiosity" to know better the great country to 
the south of uS,-now my temporary home. Such 
study would be a form of service to both countries. 
After all, Argentina and the United States are 
set on the same course. Our goal is the same. Our 
methods of traveling may sometimes be different, but 
our paths run parallel. And the root of any differences 
which may occur at any time between the two peoples 
is the root of most of the trouble in the world-
ignorance. And because it is an essential object of 
this great College to eradicate ignorance in all its 
protean forms-including that which sunders peoples 
who should be closest friends-- I rejoice in its existence 
and its continuance (as I do, may I add, in the privilege 
of being within its gates tonight). 
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